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Abstract 4 
We examine how land tenure arrangements affect Chinese crop farmers’ adoption of straw 5 
retention, a key conservation practice promoted by the Chinese government in part to curb rising 6 
air pollution. Using data from a 2016 farmer household survey covering 1,659 crop plots in 7 
Henan Province in central China, we analyze how straw retention choices are influenced by two 8 
different land tenure arrangements: own-contracted plots versus rented plots. Empirical results 9 
from several probit regressions reveal that, after controlling for crop choice, harvest season, 10 
spatial climate, and other plot-level and household-level covariates, a rented plot is associated 11 
with a 10.7 percent reduction in the probability of adopting straw retention after harvest 12 
throughout 2015. A Heckman selection model that corrects the sample selection bias further 13 
supports the negative correlation between less secure rented farmland and straw retention 14 
adoption. This suggests that more caution and attention is warranted to the long-term 15 
sustainability of farmland in urbanizing China as the Chinese government keeps pushing for 16 
further development of rural land rental market. 17 
 18 
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 20 
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1. Introduction 21 
Land tenure security has been shown as crucial in promoting the adoption of various 22 
conservation practices, including conservation tillage (Lee and Stewart, 1983; Soule et al., 2000), 23 
contour farming (Soule et al., 2000), conservation crops (Fraser, 2004), and stone terraces or soil 24 
bunds (Gebremedhin and Swinton, 2003). Arguably, more secure land tenure, which often refers 25 
to complete, permanent, or durable ownership of farmland, leads to higher willingness to adopt 26 
conservation practices, especially those practices with long-term soil fertility benefits. This is 27 
likely because greater land tenure security increases the likelihood of farmers reaping the 28 
benefits of land investments, which are often long-term (Feder et al., 1988; Soule et al., 2000; 29 
Fraser, 2004; Kabubo-Mariara et al., 2010). Despite the perceived significance of land tenure, 30 
there is a lack of evidence of land tenure security in conservation practice adoption, especially in 31 
developing countries. This, in part, results from varying definitions of land tenure security and 32 
heterogeneity in the ownership and tenure systems across different countries (Kabubo-Mariara et 33 
al., 2010). 34 
In China, land tenure security has particular relevance because, under the current Household 35 
Responsibility System, agricultural land is owned by the collectives at the village level, and each 36 
eligible farmer household is granted a land contract right to farm a village-allocated land parcel 37 
with up to 30 years of tenure (Hu, 1997). The distinct nature of rural tenure systems confronts 38 
Chinese farmers with greater land tenure insecurity, which could potentially hinder farmers’ 39 
investments in production and conservation practices, especially those with a long time horizon. 40 
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For instance, researchers have found that frequent land reallocation by the village collectives to 41 
accommodate growing rural population often dampens the stability and security of land tenure, 42 
resulting in a very uncertain land tenure length with an effective length of much less than 30 43 
years (Liu et al., 1998; Brandt et al., 2002; Tan et al., 2006). 44 
In fact, since Jacoby et al. (2002), many researchers have examined the impacts of land 45 
tenure insecurity in Chinese farmers’ production decisions, with a focus on input use such as 46 
organic fertilizer (e.g., Jacoby et al., 2002), land use efficiency (Zhang et al., 2011; Leight, 47 
2016), and forest output efficiency (Salant and Yu, 2016). In contrast, evidence of the impacts of 48 
land tenure in conservation practice adoption in China is relatively scarce. Wang et al. (2010) 49 
investigated the determinants of adopting conservation tillage as well as residue retention; 50 
however, they did not consider land tenure as a driving factor. Liu and Huang (2013) were 51 
among the first to assess the role of land tenure security on a conservation practice; they have 52 
shown that the ownership of land is slightly positively associated with increased likelihood of 53 
using contour cultivation.1 54 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has explicitly modeled the role of land 55 
tenure in the adoption of straw retention, an increasingly important conservation practice 56 
(Pittelkow et al., 2015) with substantial local and downwind air quality benefits as China aims to 57 
curb the PM 2.5 pollution. Straw retention (i.e., returning straw to the field) refers to a residue 58 
management strategy of covering the crop straws on the soil surface after harvest, which has 59 
                                                             
1 In fact, Chinese farmers do not own the farmland. As will be discussed in details later, the “ownership” of a plot by a farmer 
household in China is actually represented as the land contract right. 
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been proven to improve long-term soil productivity (Lu, 2015; Wang et al., 2015), boost yield 60 
(Huang et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2015), and reduce PM 2.5 emissions through burning of these 61 
fields (Li et al., 2008; Tao et al., 2013). Since 2015, many provinces in China have offered 20–60 62 
Chinese Yuan per mu subsidy to encourage straw retention adoption.2 In addition, we analyze the 63 
land tenure insecurity in a new policy context in which China increasingly promotes rural land 64 
transfers among farmers through a land rental market, and there is a lack of understanding on 65 
whether and how farmers behave differently on rented land obtained through the rental market 66 
versus their own-contracted farmland allocated by the collectives. 67 
This study aims to examine how land tenure arrangements affect Chinese farmers’ adoption 68 
of straw retention, especially in the new era of rural land transfer market. We hypothesize that 69 
more secure land tenure leads to a higher probability of straw retention adoption by crop farmers 70 
in China. In particular, we define land tenure security based on the participation of the rural land 71 
transfer market: we distinguish fields “owned” and farmed by the original contractee who 72 
obtained the allocated land from the rural village collectives from fields “rented” from other 73 
farmers through participation of the rural land rental market. We argue that farmers on rented 74 
fields are facing less secure land tenure due to the short-term nature of leasing contracts, and thus 75 
have lower willingness to undertake a conservation practice. 76 
We test the hypothesis by applying several discrete choice models to a rural household 77 
                                                             
2 In an attempt to reduce open burning of crop residues, in May 2015 the Chinese government announced a straw retention 
subsidy pilot project in five provinces—Anhui, Shandong, Hunan, Sichuan and Zhejiang, which offered a cash payment to 
farmers who returned crop straws to the field after harvest. Since 2016, the project has been extended to the entire China. Mu is 
the area unit used in China; 1 mu=0.0667 hectares. Our study analyzed crop and crop residue choices by crop farmers in Henan 
province for the 2015 growing season, and as a result they did not receive the straw retention subsidy. 
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survey during 2016 summer in Henan Province, which was based on stratified random sampling 78 
and covered all 17 prefecture-level cities. Empirically, we run a base probit regression with a 79 
tenure dummy entered as an independent variable using the full sample. Additionally, we run two 80 
separate probit models for each of the land tenure categories. We also employ a Heckman 81 
two-stage model with a selection equation on the rental decision as the first stage because 82 
growers on rented farmland may self-select into non-conservation activities. This is either due to 83 
the fact that fields that are difficult or challenging to implement a conservation practice may be 84 
likely to be rented out, or because renters are likely large-scale producers who are keener to 85 
profit maximization and thus more cognizant of cost-saving activities. The driving distance from 86 
the village to the nearest city center is used as the exclusion restriction variable in a sense that the 87 
distance to urban core would largely affect a farmer household’s decision to migrate for off-farm 88 
employment, and thus the decision to rent out fields, though it does not directly influence the 89 
adoption of straw retention. 90 
Probit regression results show that, after controlling for crop choice, harvest season, spatial 91 
climate, and other plot-level and household-level covariates, a rented plot is associated with a 92 
10.7 percent reduction in the probability of adopting straw retention after harvest throughout 93 
2015; the determinants of adoption vary a lot under different tenure arrangements. In addition, 94 
the Heckman procedure correcting the sample selection bias reveals that plots closer to the city 95 
center are more likely to be rented out. The decision to rent farmland appears to be significantly 96 
associated with decreased adoption rate of straw retention, which is consistent with the probit 97 
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results. Overall, our results confirm the hypothesis and are comparable to many studies in other 98 
countries. 99 
This study contributes to the literature of conservation practice adoption by quantitatively 100 
examining the link between land tenure security and straw retention adoption in China for the 101 
first time. More importantly, our research is of great policy relevance since it reveals the 102 
previously overlooked, potentially negative interconnection between two policies both promoted 103 
by the Chinese government—encouraging the adoption of straw retention and extending the rural 104 
land rental market—and offers insight into how the government can better promote and balance 105 
them. 106 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief review of Chinese 107 
land system and the development of the land rental market; section 3 introduces the conceptual 108 
framework; section 4 describes the data used in this study and empirical implementation; section 109 
5 discusses the empirical results; section 6 provides concluding remarks. 110 
2. Land Tenure and Land Rental Market in China 111 
China prohibits private land ownership. The current Household Responsibility System (HRS) 112 
was introduced in the early 1980s and allocates a parcel of contracted farmland to each eligible 113 
rural household on the basis of household size, which is referred to as the land contract (and use) 114 
right. Nevertheless, the allocated land is owned by village collectives represented by villager 115 
committee or township government (Hu, 1997). Farmers are free to make their own agricultural 116 
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production decisions, though they are not permitted to convert the land to non-agricultural use. In 117 
the early stages of HRS, land contracts only lasted for a 1- or 2-year period, which led to 118 
significant land tenure insecurity and discouraged farmers from making land improvements 119 
(Krusekopf, 2002). Realizing this limitation, the Chinese government lengthened the land 120 
contract terms to 15 years, further extending it to 30 years in 1993 (Zhang et al., 2011). 121 
However, the increase in duration of land contracts did not necessarily improve the tenure 122 
security for rural households: first, village collectives periodically reallocate the village land 123 
through administrative means to reach egalitarian goals in response to household demographic 124 
changes, even in the midst of land contract periods (Liu et al., 1998; Brandt et al., 2002; Tan et 125 
al., 2006). In addition, the allocations by collectives are less efficient due to inability to adjust to 126 
events of increasing rural migrants going off-farm and working outside the village, which tends 127 
to lead to productive inefficiency (Benjamin and Brandt, 2002). 128 
In response to the rising need of more secure land tenure, the central government has 129 
codified a framework for the protection of land rights and development of a land rental market, 130 
including the Land Management Law (1998), the Rural Land Contracting Law (2003), and the 131 
Property Law (2007). Subsequently, the land rental market took off rapidly, with a participation 132 
rate of about 10 percent in 2001 (Deininger and Jin, 2005), and stayed around that level for 133 
almost a decade. However, in many areas, farmland continued to be illegally reallocated by local 134 
officials (Zhang et al., 2011). With the steady increase in the number of rural workers migrating 135 
to urban regions, more and more rural households no longer have the need to keep all contracted 136 
8 
 
land due to lack of laborers, which to a large extent stimulates the development of a rural rental 137 
market. Figure 1 shows the national growth of transferred rural land in China. As can be seen, the 138 
percentage of transferred land over the total contracted land to rural household has tripled from 139 
less than 10 percent in 2008 to about one third in 2015. 140 
 141 
Figure 1.  The Scale of Land Transfers in China, 2008–2015.  142 
(Source: Author’s Calculation; Ye, 2015; Ministry of Agriculture, 2014, 2015, 2016) 143 
 144 
More recently, the Chinese government has formally announced the intent to protect and 145 
split rural land rights into three parts: ownership, contract, and use. Ensuring permanent 146 
collective land ownership, the government allows rural households to lease out the land use right 147 
while maintaining on the original land contract with the village government, which is largely to 148 
stimulate the land transfer through the rental market.3 However, the decomposition of rural land 149 
rights may raise a further question. The transferred land use right, which depends on how the 150 
                                                             
3 See the 2014 No. 1 Policy Document available at http://www.moa.gov.cn/zwllm/zwdt/201401/t20140120_3742582.htm (in 
Chinese). 
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leasing contract is made between rural households, may not be as secure as the land contract 151 
right. 152 
While the rural land transfer allows more flexible allocation of farmland across farmers, 153 
potentially moving from inefficient producers to more efficient producers, it remains uncertain 154 
how the tenants, who obtained the farmland via the rural land transfer market for a finite amount 155 
of time, would treat these land parcels differently compared to those owned and operated by its 156 
original contractees. Enlightened by previous literature on limited investments on rented land 157 
(Soule et al., 2000; Fraser, 2004; Kabubo-Mariara et al., 2010), it is reasonable to assume that 158 
tenants of rented land would have less incentive to make long-term investments, such as 159 
adopting conservation practices (i.e., straw retention) on these parcels, an issue that will be 160 
investigated in this study. 161 
3. Conceptual Framework 162 
Following previous works by McConnell (1983) and Soule et al. (2000), we develop a 163 
three-stage model to analyze the adoption behavior of straw retention under different land tenure 164 
arrangements. 165 
In the first stage, after the crop is harvested for the current growing season, the farmer 166 
household decides on the treatment of crop residues (straws), which involves a treatment cost 167 
denoted by 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗. In this context, we designate 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑠𝑠 for adopting straw retention and 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑛𝑛 for 168 
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no adoption (i.e., all other treatments such as burning and discarding).4 Straw retention requires 169 
residues covering the surface and being mixed with the soil, which can be accomplished by 170 
machinery or manpower. However, whether 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 is higher than 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 depends on the specific straw 171 
treatment as well as the crop type. Generally, when compared to burning and discarding straws in 172 
the fields, 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 > 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛. Straw treatment in the first stage will also affect farming for the next season. 173 
Let 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 be the second-season net returns under first-stage straw treatment, 𝑗𝑗. Straw retention 174 
may increase the probability of insect damage and thus hurt short-term crop yields and profits, as 175 
a result we assume 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠 < 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛. For the final stage, the farmer household is concerned with the 176 
terminal value of its farmland, denoted by 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗. Straw retention can help reduce soil erosion, 177 
improve fertility and productivity over time, and thus better retain the long-term value of the 178 
land. Therefore, 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 > 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛. 179 
Assume that farmer household selects a straw treatment option 𝑗𝑗 to maximize the present 180 
value 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗 of three terms discussed above, as shown by the following equation: 181 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑗𝑗) 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗 = 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 − 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝜆𝜆 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗 (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇⁄  (1) 182 
where 𝑟𝑟 represents the discount rate and 𝑇𝑇 the number of periods; following Soule et al. 183 
(2000), 𝜆𝜆 is included as a tenure-security indicator weighting the third term that measures the 184 
farmer household’s belief about its ability to use or sell the land in the future. Therefore, the 185 
more secure the land tenure, the higher 𝜆𝜆 and greater importance of the long-term land value in 186 
                                                             
4 Besides straw retention, other straw treatment options include burning, discarding in the fields, collecting and storage, use as 
fuel, etc. 
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household’s decision-making process. 187 
Based on equation (1), it is optimal for a rational farmer household to adopt straw retention 188 
when 189 
 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 + 𝜆𝜆 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇⁄ > 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 + 𝜆𝜆 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛 (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇⁄  (2) 190 
or 191 
 𝜆𝜆 𝛥𝛥𝑉𝑉 𝑅𝑅⁄ > 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 (3) 192 
where 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 = (𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛) − (𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠), 𝛥𝛥𝑉𝑉 = 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛  and 𝑅𝑅 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑇𝑇. Since 𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠 > 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛 and 𝑅𝑅 193 
is positive, if we generally assume 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 > 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 and 𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠 < 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛, condition (3) actually suggests the 194 
adoption of straw retention hinges on whether the potential short-term profit loss (i.e., the 195 
right-hand side) can be offset by the perceived gains in long-term land value (i.e., the left-hand 196 
side). That is, with higher 𝜆𝜆 or more secure land tenure, the farmer household is more likely to 197 
undertake long-term improvement activities such as straw retention, as stated in our hypothesis. 198 
Empirical estimate of the value of 𝜆𝜆 is lacking. In countries where private land ownership 199 
is well-established, it is plausible to assume that 𝜆𝜆 = 1 for a land owner. While in the context of 200 
China, the corresponding “owner” of farmland may be the contractee who bears both the land 201 
contract and use rights. The value of 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is possibly lower than, but close to 1, since 202 
land contractees are also confronted with tenure insecurity such as land reallocation. For renters, 203 
𝜆𝜆 should be much lower since they only possess the land use right and are mainly concerned 204 
with the short-term profits. However, 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  could be higher than zero if renters can 205 
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continually use the land, which depends on the duration of the lease. In this case, as will be noted 206 
later, more than 90 percent of the existing leases in the study region are verbal and informal on a 207 
one-year basis. Thus, we hypothesize that 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 < 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 or the probability of adopting 208 
straw retention is higher for contractees than for renters, which will be tested in our empirical 209 
model. 210 
3.1. Discrete choice model 211 
To test the above hypothesis, we employ a binary discrete choice model derived from the latent 212 
variable approach. Let 𝑦𝑦 denote a farmer household’s decision to adopt straw retention or not, 213 
which is generated from a latent variable 𝑦𝑦∗ equal to 𝜆𝜆 𝛥𝛥𝑉𝑉 𝑅𝑅⁄ − 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 from equation (3). The 214 
difference between short-term profits and long-term land values for the farmer household is 215 
unobserved, but one can observe the household’s decision of adoption. If 𝑦𝑦∗ is positive, straw 216 
retention is adopted and 𝑦𝑦 = 1 is observed; otherwise, 𝑦𝑦 = 0 is observed if 𝑦𝑦∗ is negative. 217 
For each household 𝑖𝑖, the latent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ is assumed to be a linear function of the 218 
vector of observable household, plot, and regional characteristics (𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖) as follows: 219 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛃𝛃𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 (4) 220 
where 𝛃𝛃 is the coefficient vector and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 a random error term. The linkage between 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ and 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 221 
is as follows: 222 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = �1, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ > 00, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ < 0 (5) 223 
then the probability that the household 𝑖𝑖 adopts straw retention (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1) is given by 224 
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 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1] = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ > 0] (6) 225 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝛃𝛃𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 > 0] 226 = 1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ≤ −𝛃𝛃𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖] 227 = 𝐹𝐹(𝛃𝛃𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖) 228 
where 𝐹𝐹(∙) is the cumulative distribution function of the error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. We assume that 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 229 
follows the standard normal distribution and equation (6) is estimated by probit regression. 230 
3.2. Heckman Selection Model 231 
Growers on rented plots may self-select into non-conservation activities, our plot-level 232 
estimation may subject to a sample selection problem that prevents us from obtaining unbiased 233 
estimates. First, the original farmer contractee may be more likely to rent out fields that are 234 
difficult or challenging to implement a conservation practice, possibly due to their shapes or 235 
other unobserved characteristics. Secondly, renters are probably large-scale producers who are 236 
keener to maximize profits on all grounds (including rented plots) and thus are more cognizant of 237 
all possible cost savings and prone to select the profit-maximizing practice. Given that air quality 238 
impacts from straw burning is currently external to a producer’s decision process, the renters are 239 
more likely to adopt the least costly option as opposed to more costly straw retention. To test the 240 
existence of sample selection bias, we consider the Heckman two-stage method for correction. 241 
The straw retention adoption equation, for each household 𝑖𝑖 and cultivated plot 𝑘𝑘, is 242 
assumed to take a linear form written as: 243 
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 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1] = 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (7) 244 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the adoption dummy, which equals unity if the household 𝑖𝑖 adopts 245 
straw retention on plot 𝑘𝑘; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a land tenure dummy, which equals one if the plot is rented 246 
from others, this is designed to capture the land tenure insecurity denoted earlier as 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐; 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 247 
is the vector of other plot-level and household-level control variables; 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. We 248 
assume that sample selection is present on 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , hence regular probit regression would 249 
generate biased ?̂?𝛽. Following the Heckman selection model, the selection equation is estimated 250 
as follows: 251 
 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1] = 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝛿𝛿𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (8) 252 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  contains a subset of control variables in 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 that also have an effect on the decision 253 
to rent fields; 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 includes the exclusive restriction variables, which only affect land transfer but 254 
not directly the adoption of straw retention; 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the corresponding error term. In particular, we 255 
use the driving distance from the village to the nearest prefecture-level city center in Henan as 256 
the exclusion restriction variable. The shorter the distance is, the more convenient for rural 257 
laborers to migrate for off-farm employment in urban areas and thus a higher possibility that the 258 
fields are rented out. We posit that the distance to city center can largely affect farmer 259 
household’s decision for land transfer, while it does not directly influence the adoption of straw 260 
retention.  261 
     The Heckman correction builds on the assumption that the error terms in both the adoption 262 
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and selection equations are jointly normal with correlation 𝜌𝜌  (i.e., 𝜌𝜌 = 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)). A 263 
rejection of the null hypothesis 𝜌𝜌 = 0 would indicate the presence of sample selection issues. 264 
To correct for that, a new variable called the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  will be 265 
calculated from equation (8) and added into the adoption equation (the tenure dummy 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 266 
not included), which yields: 267 
 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟[𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1] = 𝛾𝛾�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (9) 268 
where 𝛾𝛾� denotes the coefficients corrected for selection bias. 269 
In this adoption equation, we include three variables that only affect straw retention but not 270 
necessarily participation of rural land rental market for exclusion restriction purposes: a winter 271 
season dummy and average July temperature and precipitation at the county level. Unfavorable 272 
climatic conditions could reduce suitable field days available for straw retention and crop 273 
planting, especially after the summer growing season. Moreover, as the way we form plot-level 274 
samples may cause each surveyed household to have more than one plot observation, 275 
conventional regression techniques may generate biased parameter estimates for standard errors 276 
due to the presence of correlation among observations. To correct for the potential bias, we 277 
compute household-clustered standard errors in both the probit regressions and Heckman model 278 
that are robust to within-household error correlation. 279 
4. Data Description  280 
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The data used in this study is drawn from a household survey conducted by Henan Agricultural 281 
University in 2016 summer in Henan Province, a major grain production province in central 282 
China (figure 2 provides a map of the studied region). Henan is also a big crop straw producer, 283 
accompanied by severe air pollution resulted from straw burning in the open fields (Fu et al., 284 
2017). 285 
The survey covered all 17 prefecture-level cities in the province, and for each 286 
prefecture-level city, a specific number of villages are randomly selected to form a sampling 287 
fraction proportional to the total rural population in Henan. For each selected village, between 288 
three and six farmer households are randomly picked to answer the questionnaire. The number of 289 
surveyed households is 710 in total, which covered 47 counties or county-level cities, and 175 290 
villages, leading to a final of 670 valid questionnaires. The household-level data covers detailed 291 
information about agricultural production and operation throughout the year of 2015, as well as 292 
household and personal characteristics. We also supplement the survey data with climatic 293 
information obtained from the National Meteorological Information Center (NMIC), which 294 
reports historical averages over the 20-year period from 1981 to 2000 of climate variables at the 295 
county level in Henan Province. A key policy context to bear in mind is that in our study area for 296 
the 2015 crop year, there is no subsidy available for farmers specifically targeted to incentivize 297 
straw retention. 298 
 299 
 300 
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 301 
Figure 2. Map of Studied Region—Henan Province in China. 302 
(Color should be used for this figure in print) 303 
 304 
In our study area, many farmers grow at least two crops every year, typically corn during 305 
the autumn season (from June to October) and winter wheat during the winter season (from 306 
October to June). As a result, each year a farmer could face two straw retention choices. To better 307 
identify the impact of tenure, we treat the crop straw retention choices for these crops separately 308 
and our unit of observation is at plot-level for each season, with each representing a particular 309 
crop for a particular growing season.  310 
Importantly, all plots are classified by a binary land tenure variable: own-contracted versus 311 
rented. Own-contracted plots refer to those cultivated by the original farmer households who got 312 
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the allocated land directly from the village collectives and hold both the land contract and use 313 
rights. Rented plots are those rented out by original contractees and cultivated by farmers who 314 
only hold the land use rights. After eliminating all plots that are not cultivated in 2015, and thus 315 
do not involve any treatment of straw, we finally have 1,659 plot-level observations from 670 316 
farmer households for analysis.5 317 
For each specified plot, the farmer is asked how he or she dealt with the straws after harvest 318 
and asked to choose among the following options: straw retention (tilled in), straw retention 319 
(crushed straws broadcasted in field as cover), burnt, used for fuel, used for feed, and discarded. 320 
We assume that straw retention is adopted for a particular plot if the straw is chosen to be tilled 321 
in or broadcasted as cover, no matter whether there are other selected options as well and 322 
regardless of the specific share of straws being returned to the field (retention). 6 Of all 323 
observations, 9.3 percent of plots are rented and 90.7 percent are own-contracted, but the areas of 324 
rented plots account for 20.3 percent of total cultivated land areas in our sample. In addition, 325 
70.8 percent of plots adopted straw retention; 44.1 percent are wheat plots, 38.4 percent are corn 326 
plots, and 17.5 percent are other crops including rice, soybean, peanut, cotton and so on. Table 1 327 
and Table 2 report the descriptions and summary statistics of selected variables, respectively. 328 
  329 
                                                             
5 Due to widely used informal contracts between farmer households in most cases, it is not clear how the decision is made on a 
rented plot in this context. The decision-making process has been shown crucial in affecting adoption of conservation practices 
(Soule et al., 2000; Kurkalova et al., 2006). For instance, in the U.S., there are two types of land renter: share-renters’ decisions 
may be affected by land owners because both the owners and renters share the revenues and costs of production; cash-renters, 
however, may behave more independently since they only pay a fixed rent to the landlords while the owners do not participate in 
any activities. Failure to consider the differences in decision-making process may obscure the effect of land tenure on adoption. 
6 The survey does not collect information about the shares of straws for different straw treatments. 
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 330 
Table 1. Descriptions of Selected Variables 331 
Variable Description 
Straw retention Straw retention is adopted in the plot (1=yes, 0=no) 
Rented plot The plot is a rented plot (1=yes, 0=no) 
    
Age Age of the household head 
Farming experience Number of farming years of the household head 
Risk preference Risk preference of the household head (1=risk seeking, 0=risk averseness) 
Education Highest years of education of all household members 
Number of laborers Number of laborers that engaged in farming activities in 2015 
Income Household annual income in 2015 
Organization The household has participated in rural economic organization (1=yes, 0=no) 
Insurance The household has purchased agricultural insurance (1=yes, 0=no) 
Plot size Plot area (mu=0.0667 hectares) 
Distance to city 
Driving distance from the village to the nearest prefecture level city center in Henan 
(km) 
July temperature 
Average daily temperature of July days from 1981 to 2000 of the county that the 
household locates (℃) 
July precipitation Average annual daily precipitation of July days from 1981 to 2000 (mm) 
Winter season The plot is cultivated in the winter season (1=winter season, 0=autumn season) 
Wheat The plot is planted wheat (1=yes, 0=no) 
Corn The plot is planted corn (1=yes, 0=no) 
Other crop The plot is planted other crops (1=yes, 0=no) 
 332 
  333 
20 
 
 334 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Selected Variables 335 
Variable 
All plots Own contracted plots Rented plots T-test of 
mean diff Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Straw retention 0.708  0.45  0.712  0.45  0.665  0.47  -0.048  
Rented plot 0.093  0.29  - - - - - 
Age 44.28  11.76  44.08  11.93  46.28  9.71  2.20** 
Farming experience 28.28  13.59  28.32  13.55  27.92  14.04  -0.40  
Risk preference 0.679  0.47  0.676  0.47  0.710  0.46  0.034  
Education 12.40  3.58  12.32  3.59  13.20  3.47  0.88*** 
Number of laborers 2.611  1.26  2.620  1.27  2.516  1.21  -0.104  
Income 4.200  3.16  4.079  2.96  5.367  4.47  1.288*** 
Organization 0.041  0.20  0.041  0.20  0.039  0.19  -0.003  
Insurance 0.129  0.34  0.116  0.32  0.258  0.44  0.142*** 
Plot size 4.135  4.25  3.802  2.61  7.363  10.80  3.561*** 
Distance to city 52.30  38.63  52.50  38.72  50.37  37.73  2.13 
July temperature 26.98  0.36  26.97  0.36  27.05  0.34  0.08*** 
July precipitation 337.6  70.4  336.5  67.7  348.2  92.0  -11.74** 
Winter season 0.461  0.50  0.463  0.50  0.439  0.50  -0.024  
Wheat 0.441  0.50  0.443  0.50  0.413  0.49  -0.031  
Corn 0.384  0.49  0.387  0.49  0.355  0.48  -0.032  
Other crop 0.175  0.38  0.170  0.38  0.232  0.42  0.063* 
        Observations 1659 1504 155 
 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 336 
Farm operator attributes appear to be important in adopting soil conservation practices (Feder et 337 
al., 1988; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; Baumgart-Gets et al., 2012). In this study we focus on 338 
three farmer characteristics: the age of the household head who is also the main operator, years 339 
of farming, and risk preference. More experienced operators are apt to be adopters because of 340 
better knowledge. Risk preference has been shown important in conservation practice adoption 341 
(Fox et al., 1991; Baumgart-Gets et al., 2012). It could also be relevant in this context since straw 342 
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retention serves as a long-term land investment that possibly sacrifices short-term profits, which 343 
involves uncertainty. The household head’s attitude towards risk is measured through responses 344 
to a binary question “whether you will utilize a newly developed fertilizer that may increase 345 
yields but has not been used yet.” We hypothesize that a risk-seeking operator would adopt straw 346 
retention with a higher probability. We also include highest years of education of all household 347 
members, number of laborers, family income, participation in agricultural economic 348 
organization, and purchase of agricultural insurance, and we hypothesize that a richer, 349 
well-connected farmer household with insurance coverage or extra help on machinery and labor 350 
is more likely to adopt straw retention. In particular, wealthier and insured farmers would be less 351 
vulnerable to uncertain short-term profit lost. Finally, participation in an agricultural economic 352 
organization that offers market and technology information and shares farming experience 353 
among famer participants would increase the probability of adopting straw retention. 354 
For plot-level variables, we consider plot size, crop choice, growing season, and tenure 355 
type. With a larger plot, farmers can spread their production costs, especially machinery, over the 356 
whole cropped areas (Soule et al., 2000). We also incorporate crop dummies to account for the 357 
divergent degree of difficulty dealing with the residues, which varies by crop type. For instance, 358 
corn residues are harder and much greater in length, and it thus takes more effort to grind corn 359 
straws into small pieces before covering the soil surface. A season dummy is also included 360 
because, while there is ample time after the winter crop harvest, in the autumn season (June to 361 
October) farmers are time-pressed with often less than one month between harvesting and 362 
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sowing. Our survey responses reveal that, of all the 29.2 percent of plots not adopting straw 363 
retention, about 35 percent of the respondents report that lack of time is the reason for not 364 
adopting. Thus, we expect that the winter season is associated with higher likelihood to adopt 365 
straw retention. We do not consider other topographic features such as the plot slope because 366 
Henan Province is located in a plains area, and thus there is no significant within-province 367 
variation. 368 
5. Empirical Results 369 
5.1. Probit regression results 370 
In our empirical analysis, we first report the results of several simple probit regressions in which 371 
we test whether the probability of adopting straw retention is higher in own-contracted plots than 372 
rented plots. That is, we test the null hypothesis that 𝛽𝛽 = 0, where 𝛽𝛽 = 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is 373 
the coefficient on the tenure dummy and represents the difference of tenure-security indicator 374 
between own-contracted and rented plots. The resulting estimated coefficients and marginal 375 
effects are presented in table 3. 376 
  377 
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 378 
Table 3. Results of the Binary Probit Regressions (Dependent: Adoption=1) 379 
Variable 
(1) Full sample (2) Own contracted (3) Rented 
Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff. 
Rented plot -0.3107** -0.1070 
    
Age -0.0078 -0.0025 -0.0138* -0.0044 0.0297 0.0100 
Farming experience 0.0009 0.0003 0.005 0.0016 -0.0154 -0.0052 
Risk preference 0.1325 0.0431 0.092 0.0295 0.3963 0.1394 
Education 0.0629*** 0.0201 0.0562*** 0.0178 0.1200** 0.0406 
Number of laborers 0.2497*** 0.0800 0.2429*** 0.0771 0.4562*** 0.1543 
Income 0.0201 0.0064 0.0213 0.0067 -0.0058 -0.0019 
Organization 0.7020** 0.1723 0.7589** 0.1793 0.8369 0.2098 
Insurance 0.4692*** 0.1315 0.5273*** 0.1426 0.3689 0.1177 
Plot size 0.0354** 0.0113 0.0465** 0.0148 0.0118 0.0040 
July temperature -0.2998* -0.0960 -0.4406** -0.1398 0.7746 0.2619 
July precipitation 0.0048*** 0.0015 0.0050*** 0.0016 0.0049** 0.0017 
Winter season 0.4880** 0.1535 0.6129** 0.1899 0.077 0.0260 
Intercept 5.5183 
 
9.3081** 
 
-25.678** 
 
       Crop dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1659 1504 155 
% correctly predicted 80.11% 79.32% 73.60% 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the household level. 
 380 
 381 
Column (1) in table 3 displays the results using the full sample. As can be seen, the 382 
coefficient on “rented plot” dummy is negative and significant at the one percent level. In other 383 
words, a rented plot is associated with 10.7 percent lower probability of adopting straw retention 384 
than an own-contracted plot, ceteris paribus. The result confirms our hypothesis and is consistent 385 
with previous studies regarding the tenure effect (Soule et al., 2000; Fraser, 2004; 386 
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Kabubo-Mariara, Linderhof, and Kruseman, 2010). The household-level characteristics appear to 387 
be more important in the adoption decision: higher educational attainment, greater number of 388 
laborers, participation in agricultural economic organization, and purchase of agricultural 389 
insurance are significantly and positively related to increased likelihood of adoption. Two 390 
climate variables are significant, suggesting that straw retention occurs more frequently where 391 
the climate is warmer and wetter (more rain). The positive sign on plot size reflects that larger 392 
farmland in fact lowers the average cost of adoption; and, the positive and significant winter 393 
dummy verifies the existence of seasonal effect on residue management. 394 
We also examine whether the estimated coefficients systematically differ by tenure type. We 395 
conduct separate probit regressions for each of the two tenure categories, own-contracted and 396 
rented plots, with all other independent variables the same as those in the full-sample regression. 397 
A likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients are identical across tenure 398 
types, implying that the impact of all other characteristics on adoption of straw retention relies on 399 
the specific tenure status of the plot.7 The resulting coefficients and marginal effects by tenure 400 
type are reported in columns (2) and (3) in table 3. It shows that despite similarity on other 401 
variables, the age of household head, organization participation, purchase of insurance, plot size, 402 
and seasonal effect only matter for own-contracted plots, while they have no effects on adoption 403 
for rented plots. The sharp disparity reflects a significantly different decision mechanism for a 404 
renter in adopting straw retention. 405 
                                                             
7 In conducting the likelihood ratio test, we do not specify clustered standard errors at any level in the regressions. 
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5.2. Heckman selection model results 406 
We examine whether growers on rented plots would self-select into non-conservation practice, 407 
which is tested by the Heckman two-stage model. Columns (1) and (2) in table 4 shows the 408 
estimated results for selection and adoption equation, respectively. 409 
 410 
Table 4. Results of Heckman Selection Model 411 
Variable 
(1) Selection Equation (2) Adoption Equation 
Coef. Marg. eff. Coef. Marg. eff. 
Age 0.0240*** 0.0036 -0.0010 -0.0001  
Farming experience -0.0150** -0.0022 0.0016 0.0001  
Risk preference 0.0244 0.0036 0.1779 0.0151  
Education 0.0315* 0.0047 0.0331 0.0028  
Number of laborers -0.0805 -0.0119 0.2709*** 0.0230  
Income 0.0390** 0.0058 -0.0085 -0.0007  
Organization 0.0279 0.0041 0.2692 0.0229  
Insurance 0.5140*** 0.0763 -0.2665 -0.0227  
Plot size 0.0698*** 0.0104 -0.0215* -0.0018  
July temperature 
  
0.3069 0.0261  
July precipitation 
  
0.0027* 0.0002  
Winter season 
  
-0.0733 -0.0062  
Distance to city -0.0042** -0.0006 
  
     
𝜌𝜌 -0.9607** 
Crop dummies No Yes 
Observations 1659 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Standard errors are clustered at the household level. 
 412 
As shown in column (1), contrary to results in the adoption regression, characteristics of the 413 
household head, including age and farming experience, appear to play an important role in 414 
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making land rental decisions. Higher family educational level, higher family income, and 415 
purchase of insurance are positively related to the probability of renting more farmland. In 416 
addition, the positive and significant coefficient of plot size confirms our conjecture that renters, 417 
usually as large-scale producers, are more likely to rent in greater land areas from more than one 418 
farmer household. We find that the coefficient for the exclusion restriction variable, distance to 419 
nearest city, is negative and significant, implying that farmers closer to cities tend to rent out 420 
farmland parcels. 421 
The estimated correlation coefficient 𝜌𝜌 is statistically different from zero at the five 422 
percent level with a value of -0.96, consistent with what we have found in the probit regression423 
—a rented plot is linked with decreased likelihood of adopting straw retention. Since the 424 
estimate of land tenure dummy cannot be obtained from our Heckman model, we calculate a 425 
surrogate of marginal effect of tenure arrangement by differencing the average predicted 426 
probabilities of adoption between own contracted and rented plots. The difference is about one 427 
percentage point, which implies that, after correcting for sample selection bias, the adoption rate 428 
of straw retention is one percentage point lower on rented farmland. 429 
Column (2) in table 4 reports the estimates of the adoption equation, in which we treat 430 
climate variables, the season dummy, and the crop dummies as the exclusive restrictions. All 431 
these terms are closely related to on-farm straw treatment but less relevant to land rental 432 
behaviors. We observed that the selection-bias-corrected coefficients change significantly 433 
compared with the probit results in table 3; number of laborers, July precipitation, and plot size 434 
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are the only variables that are significant. In particular, the coefficient on plot size carries an 435 
opposite sign, meaning the cost of straw retention may actually increase with land areas. The 436 
findings highlight the importance of accounting for sample selection problem. 437 
 438 
5.3. Discussion 439 
Our empirical results provide evidence that there is negative correlation between land tenure 440 
insecurity, as proxied by rented plots, and farmer’s decisions to adopt straw retention in China. 441 
Our survey shows that, of all 79 surveyed households (out of a total of 690) that rent land from 442 
others, 75 households (or about 95 percent) are based on oral land leases without legal validity; 443 
only four households (or about five percent) have signed formal and written contracts; 65 444 
households’ leases (or about 82 percent) are on a one-year-tenure basis. The figures reflect the 445 
tenure of a rented plot, or the transferred land use right, may be far less secure than land contract 446 
right in Henan province. 447 
Our findings provide valuable policy implications. The disparity of adoption rates of straw 448 
retention between own-contracted and rented plots have significant policy implications on the 449 
long-term sustainability of farmland in China, especially as China aggressively promotes the 450 
rural land rental market. In particular, the Chinese government is encouraging participation of 451 
market-based rural land transfer as an alternative of committee-intervening land reallocation to 452 
improve agricultural production efficiency. However, our results imply that more careful 453 
deliberation or monitoring is warranted on the potential impacts on less-sustainable farming 454 
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practices on the rising acres of rented grounds. Our results also suggest that the air quality and 455 
other environmental benefits from encouraged straw retention could be impacted without efforts 456 
to boost adoption on rented land. Due to less secure land tenure, farmers on rented plots have 457 
lower incentives to adopt conservation practices, causing environmental problems such as more 458 
PM2.5 emissions from straw burning and more severe soil degradation. 459 
Improving the land tenure security may be one effective measure to encourage adopting 460 
straw retention, especially on rented plots. The government should regulate the rental market by 461 
enforcing the use of a more stable and formal written contract, which incorporates specific 462 
requirements on farm operation and residue management. On the other hand, it may also be 463 
helpful to extend the current range of land contract rights transfer from within-village to 464 
cross-village or within-township, in order to allow farmer households to own more contracted 465 
land and stimulate long-run land improvements. 466 
6. Concluding Remarks 467 
Based on data from a 2016 farmer household survey in Henan Province in central China, we 468 
apply several probit regressions and a Heckman two-stage model to test the potential link 469 
between land tenure security and the probability of adopting crop straw retention. Empirical 470 
results show that farmer households are more likely to adopt straw retention after harvest on 471 
own-contracted than rented plots, which is consistent with previous literature that shows insecure 472 
land tenure often hinders adoption of conservation practices. This study provides some of the 473 
29 
 
first evidence in assessing the negative impact of land tenure insecurity on the adoption of a 474 
long-term land improvement practice, straw retention. We argue that policies should be 475 
implemented to enhance the land renters’ tenure security of their land use rights in order to boost 476 
adoption of this critical conservation practice, which is beneficial for local and downwind air 477 
quality and the long-term land fertility. 478 
Further research should explore how the specific share of straws being returned to the field 479 
is influenced by tenure class, which is not tested in this study. Moreover, the effects of different 480 
aspects of tenure security need further investigation. For instance, the duration of tenure, another 481 
important dimension of tenure security either for own-contracted or rented land, may also play a 482 
role in affecting the adoption rate. In addition, with a panel dataset, one can examine whether the 483 
adoption rate of straw retention varies over time under different policy scenarios, such as varying 484 
strictness on the burning of straws. It is possible that the higher adoption rate is mainly due to 485 
prohibition of straw burning. 486 
 487 
 488 
  489 
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